The new Norwegian system for calculation of publication credits is examined. The new system was launched due to criticism for penalizing collaborative research. It turns out that adverse incentive problems emerge as a result of this system change. We show by a simple case, that institutions will benefit (credit-wise) by adding more authors to a scientific publication. Even worse, the beneficial effect increases the more authors the paper has initially. Alternative cases indicate even stronger incentives for co-author maximization.
Introduction
The Norwegian Scientific Index (NSI 1 ), and accompanying publication credit system, was introduced in 2006. The system has many interesting facets by itself. For instance, the system is light weighted regarding impact, only including two categories for journal quality. Furthermore, it provides direct financial effects for institutions through the so-called RBO system. Although this financial component, at least up to now, has been minor in total institutional budgets, it is still one of very few components institutions can change in the short run. As such, an institutions ability to produce measurable research through this system has grown to become a vital part of Norwegian academic institutional planning. However, our main concern in this article is a proposed change, meant to be implemented this year (2016) . As a consequence, we will spend minimal space on further descriptions of the system.
Roughly, all academic publications, journal articles, proceedings and monographs are divided into 3 categories. Either, they do not give points (the publications are not accepted in NSI), or they are categorized as level 1 or 2, where level 2 is defined as ''best''. Publications within each category are given points (or credits). As of today (again roughly), level 1 gives f0:7; 1:0; 5:0g points depending on publication type-conference proceeding, journal article or monograph, respectively. Level 2 gives f3:0; 8:0g for a journal article or a monograph. In general-at least that is presumeably the ambition-the difference between level 1 and 2 is ''quality''. For readers in need of more information on the system, the following two publications are both readable and helpful (Boletsis 2016; Frantsvåg 2016) . The system itself is freely available on the web (NSD Norwegian Centre for Research Data 2016).
The proposed system change is not related to the system description above. It is related to how publication credits are divided between institutions and individuals dependent on author composition.
In ''A mathematical description of the system'' section, a mathematical description of the old and the new systems is defined. A (very) limited literature review is given in ''Literature'' section. ''Cases'' section describes two cases and provides (based on the mathematical description in ''A mathematical description of the system'' section) a simple mathematical analyses of possible incentive problems caused by the new system. Finally, based on the analysis in ''Cases'' section, ''Discussion and conclusions'' section discusses and concludes.
A mathematical description of the system
We define the following variables 2 :
Number of local (co-)authors (authors with affiliation at a given institution for a given article). A NL : Number of non-local (co-)authors (authors with affiliation outside the given institution) for the same given article).
pp:
Publication credits (points) for the given publication based on quality and typesee ''Introduction'' section.
d:
Indicator variable (2 f0; 1g) used to pick various aspects of new and old system. c:
Indicator variable (2 f0; 1g) used to pick various aspects of new and old system. ipc: Institutional publication credits received by the given institution as a result of the given combination of authors.
Based on the above definitions, the following formula (1) describes all aspects of the old and new systems:
which precisely describes the old system. This version also defines a part of the new system, where all authors are local. In such a situation, A NL ¼ 0 and (1) degenerates to ipc ¼ pp.
(3) describes the new system, when all non-local authors are affiliated at Norwegian institutions.
In (4), the final part of the new system is described. Now, A NL [ 0 and at least one of the non-local authors are affiliated at a foreign 3 institution.
Literature
Incentives in general are, and has been, a very hot topic in modern economic theory. Hence, this research tradition is extensive. As a consequence, a fair amount of work related to economic incentives in education (typically related to salary and bonus) exists. There are also some interesting papers of a more interdisciplinary type, discussing subjects similar to our's-see for instance Allan and Fryer (2011), Deci et al. (2001) , Marginson and Rhoades (2002) , Mas-Colell (2003) , Neal (2009) and Fernandez (2016) . However, two 4 articles and of a more general nature are by us (the authors) considered especially important. A simple interpretation of these articles may perhaps be: If one plans to use incentive mechanisms (financial reward or punishment, which in fact the system we discuss do), one thing seems clear. If output (in this case research quality) is hard to measure, one should be significantly more cautious when introducing such systems than in situations where output is easier to measure. Finally, a Norwegian contribution Sandnes (2016) discusses many of the same problems we discuss here, although in a much more practical and less scientific manner.
Research quality is definitely hard to measure. We can count publications, categorize them in A or B journals, compute as many publication credits, h-indices or citations we like 5 . Still, in surprisingly many cases, research nobody ever mentioned or cited has a tendency to pop up many years (sometimes more than 50) later; suddenly being both understandable and imperative. As a consequence, metric systems meant to measure research quality today should be introduced and (especially) used with extreme care. Many researchers would state that a randomized reward/punishment mechanism may be as good a financial distribution system as any other given such an understanding of research and future research quality.
Cases
In two forthcoming subsections, two practical cases are introduced, aiming to show what kind of incentive problems the new system may induce. Both cases are based on unethical behaviour by authors. If one has a belief that all researchers keep all ethical codes 6 strictly, these cases are (of course) of no interest. However, many cases, even recent (see for instance the so-called ''Macchiarini scandal'' (Enseri 2016), indicate that academic scholars are like most others, sometimes both tempted to as well as actually acting on the border of ethical correctness.
Case 1: Incentives to add foreign authors to a single article Case 1 is defined as follows: we assume that a certain article originally has A L ¼ A 7 local authors only. As shown previously (''A mathematical description of the system'' section), the old and the new system produces the same institutional publication credits, in this case:
Suppose now, that all authors A agree on including a foreign author as another coauthor. In such a case, institutional publication credits are [by formula (1)] calculated as:
Now, the following inequality is interesting to investigate:
This inequality (7) tells under which number of local authors it is profitable (ipc-wise) to choose an extra foreign author. After some simple algebra, inequality (7) can be rewritten as:
which means that it is beneficial for the institution to add a foreign author to the paper if the original paper has at least 2 authors 8 . Furthermore, if (7) is rewritten as:
Then,
which indicates that for any number of local authors (A L ¼ A), it is beneficial to add an extra foreign author (first derivative positive) but the effect is diminishing (second derivative negative), meaning that it is relatively less ''profitable'' to add an extra foreigner if the number of local authors is high compared to low. The full image is shown in Fig. 1 , where the left and right hand side of inequality (7) is plotted in the same diagram.
As Fig. 1 indicates, the effect of adding an extra foreign author is biggest when the number of local authors are small, and already at 9 local authors, the institutional publication credits moves from 1, 0 to (1 Á ffiffiffi ffi Obviously, the system has equal incentive effects on the individual level. If we consider the simplest case-all local authors only have local affiliation-the crucial inequality can (on the individual level) be written as:
Surely, nothing changes as multiplication with A (A [ 0) produces the original inequality (7), and individual incentives are just as strong as institutional incentives. 8 In fact, it is more complex than this, as the system allows a single author to have more than one affiliation. Hence, a situation with 1.45 authors may actually be practically feasible. However, such cases are not analysed further here. 9 Average number of authors of a scientific article varies significantly between disciplines. In medicine for instance or physics, 9 to 10 authors are not big numbers. In economic theory or mathematics, 10 authors are considered a big number.
Case 2: Incentives as a result of combining more than one article One may be mislead to believe that the factor 1.3 is the only problem with the new system. This is definitely not the case. Also the square root may lead to tempting unethical incentives-both at the institutional and individual level.
Let us examine the following setting. Two Norwegian scholars (affiliated at institutions A and B have written one paper each, ready for publication. assume now that instead of publishing this work individually, they look at a collective solution; in this case, being coauthors of each others papers. Given the original (and highly ethical) ''solution'', both institutions would achieve pp publication credits. However, the new (and somewhat unethical) ''solution'' gives institution A, pp Á ffiffi 1 2 q from the paper written by the scholar at institution A, but also the same from institution B. The math is simple (for any of the institutions);
One does not have to stop here. Adding a foreign (free-riding) author (without an additional article) has the following consequence: Each of the two Norwegian academic institutions get publication credits:
which is even more beneficial (publication credits-wise) than the previous ''solution'' as:
or 1:69 [ 1:5 which clearly is true. 
Discussion and conclusions
This article has shown, by the aid of some simple examples (named Cases in the text), that the new system for calculation of publication credits in Norway, has its sides. A system which opens up for customization of the author list on an article to reach more credit than a single author would produce for an institution, can not be neither good nor sensible. Some of us claim that too many papers already have too many authors-se for instance Goldstein (2016) and Haugen (2016) . After all, research and its credibility is to some extent actually dependent on actual authors that may answer actual questions regarding the content of research papers. The probability of increased free-riding is of course an expected outcome of such a system. That is, to change a system into a version which in all dimensions add value to more article authors seems like an extremely bad idea.
We have limited information related to the decision process underlying this change, but it seems very unlikely that anybody who has a simple course in modern economic theory has had anything to in this process. The solution is simple. Move back to the original system, and if one wants more national or international collaboration, reward or punish in a separate process, outside the system for calculating publication credits.
Of course, if one believes (like we) that real good research today, either is baffling or highly controversial, it will most probably not be published today, at least not in high ranked journals. It will hence not be cited (today) or give any author or journal impact. As a consequence, introducing metric systems (today) to try to measure what is good or bad research (tomorrow) must be a bad idea, leading to rewarding mediocre research and punishing (potentially) good research. Unfortunately, it seems hard for the new public managers of today's academia to understand such a simple argument.
Surely, an incentive system rewarding more collaboration, both national as well as international can have real positive effects. Some researchers may indeed choose to substitute both local co-authors with national non-locals or foreign ones without any purpose of maximising publication credits. In an empirical setting, the problem is perhaps to separate individual scholar motives. However, if Norwegian journal articles suddenly start emerging with single foreign co-authors or unusual paring of authors, some natural suspicion should lead to a critical judgement of reasons for such a development, and perhaps also, a critical review of whether this system needs redesign.
